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SUMMARY 
 
From its early days, the academic debate on public goods has focused on discrepancies 
or trade-offs regarding the provision of public goods on the one hand and private 
goods on the other. However, both the extension of the public domain and an 
increasing interdependence in international relations clearly drive the expansion of an 
agenda in which there are a growing number of cases where public goods collide with 
each other. This trend is mirrored by an increase in conflicts among international 
regimes, since regimes either act as the legal providers of such goods or can be 
considered public goods themselves.  
The working paper first outlines the logical nature of the connection between both 
kinds of conflicts and illustrates this relation by presenting examples of 
incompatibilities among free trade regimes and environmental regimes. Second, 
moving from description to analytical reflection, the article introduces and discusses 
an assumption about the outcome of regime conflicts. Based on the distinction of 
different types of public goods, this assumption predicts that those regimes providing 
designed public goods tend to prevail over regimes regulating pure public goods. This 
hypothesis will be applied to the conflict about the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), showing that complementary explanatory factors such as power 
constellations or regime design have to be taken into account. 
 
 
1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the following, I intend to link two phenomena which have in recent years attracted 
the attention of scholars across disciplines, namely collisions among international 
regimes on the one hand and conflicts among global public goods on the other. The 
main objective of this working paper is to establish a logical connection between both 
phenomena and to make this connection usable in order to predict the consequences of 
both types of conflicts.  
The second section of this working paper will elucidate the character of this 
connection, leading to the deductive conclusion that – under given circumstances – 
regime conflicts can be used as signposts when examining public goods conflicts. This 
conclusion will be based on two possible understandings of the role of regimes; their 
function as providers of public goods and their classification as public goods 
themselves. After introducing a definition of international regime conflicts, the 
remainder of the second section will explore the connection between the two sorts of 
conflicts by illustrating the variety of regime incompatibilities at the intersection of 
free trade and several environmental public goods. 
Moving from description to analytical reflection, the third section of the working paper 
explores how to make this connection usable for the analysis of global public goods 
conflicts, with particular regard to the question of which good “prevails” in such a 
conflict (i.e. which good does achieve a comparative advantage in terms of its 
provision) and for what reason it does so. Building on the earlier observation that 
colliding regimes mirror the conflictive overlap of the public goods they are 
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 regulating, it will be argued that an analytically feasible way to answer this question is 
to direct the investigation towards the different consequences of such conflicts for the 
affected regimes – or, more specifically: to explain the prevalence of a particular 
regime. In order to further explore the viability of this research program, a first 
hypothesis will be generated, predicting the potential consequences of regime 
conflicts. The explanatory factor in this hypothesis will build on a crucial achievement 
of the recent literature on global public goods, namely the notion of different types of 
‘publicness’, distinguishing between pure public goods and designed public goods. 
Finally, the working paper will briefly explore the plausibility of this hypothesis in 
light of the conflict between the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
 
 
2  SLOWLY EXPANDING THE AGENDA: BRINGING COLLISIONS AMONG PUBLIC 
GOODS INTO FOCUS 
 
2.1  OLD BINOCULARS FOR MOVING TARGETS: MISSING HALF OF THE PICTURE  
 
Before developing the argument about the logical connection between regime conflicts 
and public goods conflicts, a brief retrospection shall illustrate that both scholars of 
economics and international relations have taken into account the phenomenon of 
collisions among public goods only rather late. This is quite astounding, since they 
were anything but unaware of two major trends, namely the blurring frontier between 
public and private domains on the one hand, and the increasing interdependence on the 
international level on the other. 
Starting with its introduction into the academic economist debate by Paul Samuelson 
(1954), the concept of public goods has immanently forced every scholar who used the 
concept to provide an explicit delimitation of the term against its private counterpart. 
At first glance, this ongoing demarcation seems redundant, since well into the 1990s 
the major distinctive criteria used in textbooks – namely (non-)rivalry in consumption 
and (non-)excludable benefits – have not undergone serious changes. Nevertheless, 
whereas the theoretical underpinnings have remained fairly stable, the empirical 
ground has moved. Due to developments such as technological progress, economic 
liberalization and privatization, the substantial scopes of these criteria, i.e. the actual 
types of goods which could be assigned to the two labels, have significantly shifted in 
recent decades (Kaul/Mendoza 2003: 78f.). 
More specifically, the frontier between private and public displays a growing 
permeability, mostly in one direction: the expansion of the public domain. 
 
“The shifts between private and public […] reflect greater shared concern for the public domain 
among all the main actors – the state, businesses, civil society organizations, and households – 
and for what others expect of them and how their private activities affect others.” (ibid.).  
 
This blurring of the frontier between private and public has kept scholars busy with 
their focus on collisions across this very frontier, i.e. with their concentration on 
conflicts between public goods on the one hand, and private ones on the other. They 
had good reason to keep this focus, since the change in the character of some goods 
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constantly added new potential cases to their research agenda – an agenda which, 
among other objectives, tried to pinpoint the conditions for an appropriate provision of 
single public goods in light of collective action problems such as free-riding. Most 
prominently, Olson (1965) developed an analytical approach to predict chances for 
successful cooperation, depending on which side of the public-private fence the 
respective good is located. According to this theorem, a single actor’s willingness to 
pay for public goods is very low, since he or she cannot be excluded from the 
consumption of these goods. Following this deductive approach, one can assume that 
rational actors, i.e. actors with stable preferences who try to minimize their costs and 
maximize their benefits, will cooperate when it comes to the provision of private 
goods rather than bear the costs of providing public ones. This assumption has, for 
instance, revealed particular explanatory strength when applied to the “tragedy of the 
commons”, i.e. the collision between sustainability concerns on the one hand, and 
short-term economic benefits on the other (Hardin 1968; Ostrom 1977, 1990). 
To sum up, there has been considerable progress in the scholarly perception of the 
extension of the public domain and in the subsequent economic analyses of conflicts 
between public goods and private goods. Given this progress, it is yet more astounding 
that until present, a second offspring of the extension of the public sphere has not been 
put on the research agenda with at least a remotely similar fervor. With more and more 
goods gaining public qualities (at least in terms of public concern for them), it should 
not have come as a surprise to researchers that more and more cases have appeared in 
which public goods collide with each other. 
This omission is even more startling in light of another development which is logically 
connected to the widening of the public domain: an increasing both mutual and costly 
dependence among states on the international level. Again, scholars have captured a 
considerable portion of the picture, but not all of it. True, international relations 
theorists, and in particular proponents of the neo-institutionalist school of thought, 
have analyzed the growing interdependence in the most different policy areas. In 
particular, they have explored the extent to which this interdependence could induce 
the formation of international regimes. For instance, Keohane and Nye distinguished 
between two dimensions of this mutual dependence according to the extent to which 
the resulting costs could be avoided through internal or unilateral policy changes. 
Whereas “sensitivity” still allows for such steps, the emerging phenomenon of 
“vulnerability” refers to the incapacity of states to take appropriate and sustainable 
cost-avoiding measures on their own; subsequently, vulnerable states have displayed a 
growing propensity to engage in negotiations with other governmental actors on the 
international level (Keohane/Nye 1989: 10ff). 
However, these and other analyses of growing interdependence on a global level 
mostly looked at the consequences of international cooperation outcomes within one 
and the same policy field. In other words: they plausibly explained international 
agreements – up to the formation of regimes or organizations – on separate trans-
boundary challenges such as ozone layer depletion or trade liberalization. Hence, very 
much akin to their economist counterparts, international relations theorists captured 
only half of the picture. They missed a phenomenon closely linked to the very 
tendency of growing interdependence: the increasing overlap of different policy fields 
and policy objectives and the respective intersections of programs and outcomes 
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 associated with these fields, including the incompatibility of mechanisms designed to 
provide public goods. In fact, as will be briefly outlined below, it took until the mid-
1990s for a respectively comprehensive research outlook to evolve. 
 
 
2.2 CONSEQUENCE OR ESSENCE? INTERNATIONAL REGIME CONFLICTS AS 
SIGNPOSTS OF COLLIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 
 
This and the next section (2.3) shall provide a conceptual deductive clarification on 
how collisions between global public goods can be grasped and analyzed. At the 
outset, it is important to stress that the following argument is clearly restricted to a 
particular level and type of conflict, namely conflicts among regimes operating on the 
international level. Why regimes? As this paper intends to show, the contradictive 
overlaps of international regimes mirror the collisions of the global public goods they 
regulate. More specifically, regime conflicts can embody public goods conflicts in a 
double sense: first, as their consequence (given the quality of regimes as producers of 
public goods) and second, as their essence (given the quality of regimes as public 
goods themselves). 
With regard to the first sense, leading proponents of the literature on public goods 
agree on the specific role of regimes as essential providers of public goods on the 
international level. For instance, Kaul and LeGoulven stress that, despite the 
importance of other mechanisms such as unilateral action by governments or even 
private entities, multilateral agreements should be considered as comparatively reliable 
producers of global public goods (Kaul/LeGoulven 2003: 373ff). This assessment rests 
upon a “triangle of publicness” (Kaul/Conceição et al. 2003: 24) which distinguishes 
among a good’s publicness in consumption, publicness in decision-making and 
publicness in the distribution of net benefits. When interpreted as providers of public 
goods, international regimes can particularly play an important role in providing the 
latter two of these dimensions.  
What is the rationale behind international regimes providing for publicness in 
decision-making and distribution of benefits? It is obvious that, even at the local level, 
not everyone consuming a good can be equally involved in the process of deciding 
about this very good. Subsequently, when going global, it will be even more difficult 
to provide for a good which is public in decision-making. Moreover, on an 
international scale, not only individual private actors, but also aggregate public actors 
such as states might be tempted into free-riding. Facing these pitfalls, international 
regimes can counter actors’ tendencies to defect by giving these actors, a share in 
decision-making, and by providing sustainable and iterative structures for interaction. 
The resulting stability and transparency of the decision-making process will eventually 
alter the preferences of the actors involved; more concretely, the process will help 
diminish uncertainties (about the behaviour of others) which previously have lured 
actors into free-riding (Keohane 1984: 89f). Instead, actors will increasingly comply 
with the agreed rules, hence guaranteeing a fair provision of the benefits. Thus, ideally 
speaking, international regimes can enforce the production of public goods on both the 
international and national level and at the same time instigate or operate monitoring 
and reporting of this production. 
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Given this close functional connection between international regimes and global public 
goods, it should hardly be surprising that both of the aforementioned trends – the fact 
that more and more issues are “going public” as well as the increasing international 
interdependence – have been accompanied by a dramatic increase in the number of 
international regimes. This ongoing regulation process in international relations has, to 
some extent, led to substantial and functional overlaps between regimes, i.e. the 
various rules addressing specific issue areas do not always make up a coherent and 
complementary system. Instead, most of these rule systems have been developed 
independently of each other, they cover different geographic and substantial scopes, 
and are marked by different patterns of codification, institutionalization and cohesion 
including different compliance mechanisms and sanctioning capacities. As a result of 
this uncoordinated process, some regimes contain rules for conduct which directly 
contradict the provisions of other regimes and hence might make full compliance with 
every regime impossible. 
Given these parallel trends one might easily argue that regime conflicts have 
predominantly arisen as consequences of public goods conflicts. But is it appropriate 
to simply infer a causal connection between both phenomena? In other words: can any 
incompatibility among international regimes be interpreted as a logical consequence of 
conflicting public goods?  
In order to answer this question properly, it is essential to take a closer look at 
different types of regime conflicts. This will be undertaken in section 2.4. However, at 
this point, it is helpful to introduce a first vital distinction among two types of regime 
overlap, namely between constitutive and operational interplay (Young 2002: 125ff). 
Applying this distinction to the phenomenon of regime conflicts, one needs to 
differentiate whether regimes collide with regard to some major principles and core 
norms (= constitutive conflict), or whether they merely collide over the mechanisms 
and means they prescribe in order to attain their objectives (= operational conflict)? 
Bearing this distinction in mind, one can make the following qualification: If a regime 
conflict is merely operational and if alternative tools are at hand,1 one should clearly 
refrain from simply tracing a conflict among two regimes back to a potential conflict 
among the subject matters of these regimes. In this case, chances still exist for a more 
harmonious if not synergetic pursuit of both objectives. Likewise, in case of 
constitutive conflicts which are rooted in the incompatibility of chief regime objectives 
(e.g. public goods such as biological diversity on the one hand versus accessibility of 
genetic information on the other), a connection between both kinds of conflicts should 
obviously be considered.    
                                                 
1  In the terminology of Rittberger and Zürn one could also phrase this condition as if we are facing a 
conflict about means, but not one about values (Rittberger/Zürn 1990: 31f). In a similar way, G. 
Kristin Rosendal developed a valuable analytical framework for the study of institutional overlaps 
(Rosendal 2001: 96ff). Building on Krasner and his four-fold definition of international regimes - 
principles, norms, rules, procedures (Krasner 1983: 2) - Rosendal distinguishes four types of 
divergence between regimes. These types differ depending on the (compatible or diverging) 
constellation of core and secondary norms as well as on the relation of programmatic and regulatory 
rules across regimes. She expects overlaps between regimes with diverging core norms and diverging 
regulatory rules to have the highest scope for conflict, whereas programmatic incompatibilities should 
have higher potential for synergies. 
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 Having argued that constitutive international regime conflicts are signposts of 
colliding global public goods, this does not necessarily mean that there is a direct 
causal link between the two. This is the time to bring in an alternative, or rather 
complementary assessment of the connection between both phenomena. Rather than 
stressing a (chrono)logical sequence of public goods conflicts and regime conflicts, 
this notion considers regime conflicts as the very essence of public goods conflicts, 
arguing that international regimes can be considered to be public goods themselves. 
Among others, Young contends that “[i]nternational regimes, like other social 
institutions, will ordinarily exhibit the attributes of collective goods (that is, non-
excludability and jointness of supply) to a relatively high degree” (Young 1989: 21, n. 
31). 
However, it is obvious that the feature of non-excludability does not apply to every 
benefit a regime generates or offers. Clearly, regimes still discriminate between 
members and non-members, making it far more likely for certain benefits to be 
enjoyed only by a particular group of actors (e.g. a certain portion of regime parties). 
“Indeed, what are collective goods to some, may be private goods to others” 
(Hasenclever/Mayer/Rittberger 1997: 96). Olson illustrates this discrepancy by 
describing a parade: 
 
“that is a collective good to all those who live in tall buildings overlooking the parade route, but 
which appears to be a private good to those who can see it only by buying tickets for a seat in 
the stands along the way.” (Olson 1965: 14, n. 21) 
 
Furthermore, it is simply a matter of fact – backed by considerable historical 
experience – that states failing to comply with major regime injunctions can be 
excluded from the advantages of a regime. For instance, they can be excluded from the 
benefits of the free trade regime when refusing to open their markets, with 
considerable consequences: “[o]ther members might close their own markets to the 
products of those states, while continuing to practice openness in their mutual 
exchange relations.” (Hasenclever/Mayer/Rittberger 1997: 97). 
Subsequently, it is not advisable to simply equate international regimes with public 
goods. Nevertheless, it would be ignorant to dispense with the argument altogether 
since a number of regimes are certainly likened to public goods. A helpful indicator 
for this sort of regimes has been developed by Kaul and Mendoza who differentiate 
between stocks such as regimes, norms or knowledge, and flows, i.e. policy outcomes 
such as peace or financial stability (Kaul/Mendoza 2003: 104). Whereas they term 
flows as “final public goods”, they label stocks as “intermediate public goods”. Stocks 
are ‘public’ in that they are fully located in the public domain, and intermediate since 
their consumption is often “of an instrumental character”, e.g. by providing 
information and behavioral guidance, but mostly by producing or regulating a final 
public good. Drawing from this distinction, one can state that international regimes can 
be interpreted as public goods whenever their subject matter, i e. the final public good 
underlying them, displays the qualities of non-excludability and non-rivalry. Hence, 
irrespective of which regime benefits are restricted to non-members (e.g. emissions 
trading in case of the Kyoto Protocol), the ultimate objective (e.g. global climate 
stability) cannot be denied to any kind of actor.  
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Concluding this section, the lessons to be drawn from the restrictions of both lines of 
argument – regime conflicts either as consequences or as essences of public goods 
conflicts – remarkably coincide in a simple caveat: to have a closer look at the goals 
and principles of regimes. In short: regime conflicts should only be captured as 
signposts for public goods conflicts if, a) both regimes have the objective to provide a 
good that fulfills the criterion of publicness, and b) both regimes collide about major 
principles and core norms which are substantially linked to these very objectives. 
 
 
2.3  DEFINING INTERNATIONAL REGIME CONFLICTS 
 
Having both established and qualified the double link between global public goods and 
international regimes, this section briefly embarks upon developing a working 
definition of the term “regime conflict” itself.  
The first step towards a definition of regime conflicts is to look at the more general 
phenomenon of regime interactions. In his taxonomy, Oran Young (1996: 2ff; cf. King 
1997: 18ff) differentiates between four types of such “institutional linkages” (Young 
1996: 2ff; cf. King 1997: 18ff):  
1)  “Embedded institutions” (issue-specific regimes embedded in overarching 
institutional arrangements);  
2)  “Nested institutions” (specific arrangements restricted in terms of functional scope, 
geographical domain, etc. “are folded into broader institutional frameworks that 
deal with the same general issue area but are less detailed in terms of their 
application to specific problems”); 
3)  “Clustered institutions” (regimes combined with other regimes of other issue areas 
into “institutional packages”, i.e. a common and more generic framework);  
4)  “Overlapping institutions” (regimes formed for different purposes and largely 
without reference to one another intersecting “on a de facto basis, producing 
substantial impacts on each other in the process”). 
Unlike the first three types of regime linkages, the overlap of institutions is “often 
unforeseen and unintended by the creators of individual regimes” (ibid.: 6). 
International regime conflicts belong to the fourth type. However, they are not to be 
equated with it, since the mutual impact of an unforeseen intersection could also prove 
to be positive, i.e. synergetic. 
Hence, for a proper definition of regime conflicts, one more aspect needs to be added 
to Young’s understanding of this fourth type of overlapping institutions. This missing 
link is the aspect of “contradictive externality”. The term “contradictive” borrows from 
Dahrendorf’s definitions of “conflict” as any kind of relation between elements which 
is characterized by objective (latent) or subjective (manifest) contradictions 
(Dahrendorf 1961: 201). Contradictive externality implies that regime A – outside the 
behavioral complex of a regime B – collides with the objectives and rules of regime 
B.2 Subsequently, a regime conflict can be defined as a functional overlap among two 
                                                 
2  The understanding of “external” follows the study of Young/Levy (1999) on regime environmental 
effectiveness. In that study, the terms “internal” and “external” refer to the behavioral complex each 
regime is embedded in, including the problem to be solved, the different stakeholders and their 
interests, etc. However, Young and Levy are using these terms to qualify the consequences of a single 
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 or more international regimes (formed for different purposes and largely without 
reference to one another), consisting of a significant contradiction of rules and/or rule-
related behavior.  
 
 
2.4  INTERNATIONAL REGIME CONFLICTS ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES: SIGNPOSTS 
FOR THE COLLISION OF FREE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC GOODS  
 
After deductively arguing in favor of a connection between public goods conflicts and 
international regime conflicts, it is now time to look at the empirical evidence for such 
a connection. With the tendency towards intensified regulation on the international 
level, it is not surprising that regime interactions in general, and regime conflicts in 
particular, have appeared within and across highly different policy fields. Nonetheless, 
apart from an exceptional debate about interlocking institutions in the domain of 
international security dating back to the 1970s,3 scholars of various disciplines have 
only slowly shifted their focus towards this empirical phenomenon. The conclusions of 
more recent studies on cases of regime overlap involving environmental institutions 
coincide in the notion “that much interesting work remains to be done to formulate and 
examine assumptions about how and when overlap between international institutions 
will affect the effectiveness of international environmental cooperation” (Rosendal 
2001: 113).4  
Building on the increasing number of studies on regime interactions, the remainder of 
this working paper intends to approach the phenomenon of regime conflicts in a more 
comprehensive and comparative manner, beginning with a typological account of 
regime conflicts. First of all, however, the topical focus of this paper needs to be 
justified – namely its concentration on environmental and trade regimes. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
regime in relation to its own effectiveness. Unhelpful external effects are non-intended consequences 
outside of the regime’s geographic and/or substantial scope. They contradict the objectives of the very 
regime and might, in the worst case, produce boomerang effects. 
3  This debate has recently been revived with a focus on inter-organizational collisions in the field of 
international security (cf. Daase 2004; Grigorescu 2004; Hardy/Phillips 1998; Wallander/Keohane 
1999). Furthermore, the human security concept attempts to tackle the increasing overlaps between 
security and other public goods (cf. Buzan 1997). 
4  Among the more encompassing research projects, three are particularly noteworthy: first, the Inter-
Linkages Initiative of United Nations University (Chambers 2001; Velazquez/Piest 2003); second, the 
Institutional Interaction Project (Gehring/Oberthür 2004; Oberthür/Gehring 2003, 2006), the latter 
comprising a large number of case studies mostly concerning the interaction of international treaty 
systems and EU environmental instruments. A third and still ongoing major project on regime 
interplay, the Institutional Dimensions of Global Environmental Change (IDGEC) project, has been 
developed under the auspices of the International Human Dimensions Programme on Global 
Environmental Change (IHDP). This project also takes into account the horizontal and vertical 
interaction of institutional arrangements (cf. King 1997; Young 2002, 2002a). 
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2.4.1  WHY FOCUSING ON ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES AND TRADE REGIMES? 
 
When it comes to environmental regimes, it is fairly easy to make the connection to 
global public goods, at least in a functional sense of regimes as providers of such 
goods. Environmental regimes have been specifically designed with a view to setting 
rules for dealing with trans-boundary ecological challenges. These rules regulate (and 
thereby intend to guarantee the provision of) certain final public goods, namely non-
excludable subject matters such as biological diversity or clean air.  
However, as much as this connection is evident for environmental regimes, the same 
line of argument might be called into question when looking at the second type of 
regimes under scrutiny. Do free trade regimes produce a final public good after all? 
Conybeare for instance refutes this notion of free trade being a public good, observing 
that:  
 
“free trade exhibits excludability and rivalry, and is fundamentally a problem of predatory 
income transfers, whereas the public good situation centers on the problem of introducing free 
riders to contribute to the supply of the public good.” (Conybeare 1984: 8) 
 
The problem with this assessment is that it puts the focus on the (ultimate) 
consequences of free trade, namely the final distribution of traded goods and services.  
Certainly, due to market failure and unbalanced resource distribution, these goods or 
services might indeed end up in the hands of few. However, when examining the 
public character of trade liberalization as such, it is crucial not to focus solely on final 
and mostly non-intended consequences. Rather, the spotlight should be focused on free 
trade as a process. Major features of this process are the improved general accessibility 
and availability of certain products. These procedural benefits can be considered as 
public goods themselves since they fulfill the major criteria for defining such goods. 
For example, the criterion of non-excludability is well reflected in the free access 
across borders to foreign products and services.  
This point of free trade regimes as public access or consumption providers can be 
further backed by coming back to the triangle of publicness referred to earlier 
(Kaul/Conceição et al. 2003: 24; cf. Albin 2003). This triangle also includes the 
criterion of a good’s publicness in consumption. By the same token, Mendoza argues 
that the global trade regime’s “benefits (and costs) are available for the global public 
to consume – to some extent whether they choose to or not” (Mendoza 2003: 460).  
Having thus argued in favor of the notion that both environmental regimes and free 
trade regimes serve as providers of public goods, the question remains why exactly 
these two types of regimes have been chosen here to illustrate the connection between 
conflicts among international regimes on the one side and conflicts among global 
public goods on the other. Two reasons can be named for this choice: an analytical one 
and an empirical one. As for the former, the previous argumentation has insinuated 
that, although both subject matters – free trade and environmental resources – can be 
identified as public goods, this classification is due to very different characteristics. 
These characteristics are consequential qualities in the case of ecological goods (for 
which the respective regimes predominantly try to provide public decision-making and 
public distribution whereas public consumption often already exists beforehand), and 
process features in the case of free trade (for which the respective regimes intend to 
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 provide public consumption). Further elaboration on this difference will be provided 
below (section 3.2). At this point, it should suffice to state that such a variation in the 
quality of the conflicting public goods might prove highly useful when trying to 
explain the outcome of such conflicts, i.e. why these conflicts have different effects on 
the involved goods and the regimes regulating them.  
Apart from this analytical reason, there is also an empirical incentive for focusing on 
conflicts between trade regimes and environmental regimes: in fact, a considerable 
number of constitutive conflicts exist between both types of regimes.5 This amount of 
observable cases provides a welcome starting point for a preliminary examination of 
the underlying assumption of this working paper, namely that constitutive regime 
conflicts mirror public goods conflicts. 
 
 
2.4.2  TYPES AND EXAMPLES OF REGIME CONFLICTS ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
 
The following lines intend to sketch the diversity of regime conflicts on environmental 
issues by differentiating and illustrating chief types of regime incompatibilities. 
Moreover, this part will elaborate on what has just been said about the frequency and 
intensity of trade-environment conflicts. In fact, the majority of the examples to follow 
will be cases of constitutive conflicts between a trade regime and an environmental 
regime. 
A first major line shall be drawn between the latent (or legal) type of regime conflicts 
on the one hand and the manifest (or political) type of conflicts on the other. Latent 
regime conflicts take the shape of incompatibilities of rules, i.e. they are not 
manifested in an immediately perceivable conflictive behavior of actors. Among the 
most prominent cases are conflicts between the trade provisions of multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs) on the one hand, and General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules on the other hand. As early as 1996, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) identified about 20 
MEAs containing trade provisions. Of these MEAs, three in particular authorize 
measures that clearly violate GATT rules through so-called trade-related 
environmental measures (TREMs), namely: the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) of 1975 (which is one of a 
series of regimes promoting the global public good of biological diversity), the 
Montreal Protocol of 1989 (which regulates the public good of a sustainable ozone 
layer) and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal of 1992 (which affects several public goods 
from health concerns to clean air and soil). All three regimes collide with GATT “by 
banning the import of various substances on the basis of the status of the country of 
origin (e.g. countries that are not Parties to the MEA, Parties to the MEA that fall into 
particular categories, and Parties not in compliance with the MEA)” (Werksman 2001: 
                                                 
5  Of course, trade regimes are not the only kind of institutions which can collide with environmental 
regimes. As Dinah Shelton has shown, multilateral environmental agreements have also gotten into 
conflict with resolutions of the International Labour Organisation or with United Nations human rights 
regimes, e.g. about the right to reproduce, which has been attested in the final document of the UN 
International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo (Shelton 2001: 257). 
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183). More precisely, the three MEAs are partly incompatible with the most-favored 
nation treatment of Article 1 GATT which promotes equal import or export conditions 
for the same good to all parties.6 Still, despite the contradiction between the 
abovementioned TREMs and WTO rules, so far the record shows no WTO challenge 
to a trade-related MEA measure. This rather surprising evidence justifies the 
classification of these incompatibilities as merely latent conflicts.7  
Unlike latent conflicts, manifest conflicts do not or do not only appear among rules, 
but have materialized in the form of disputes over behavioral contradictions among 
actors. This understanding still leaves open when in a regime’s life-cycle (e.g. during 
negotiations or after entry into force), where (e.g. within regime organs or before 
courts of third parties) and, most of all, in which context or why (e.g. because of their 
initiatives for regime change or because of their compliance with contradicting rules) 
certain actors come into conflict with each other. Moreover, the focus on behavioral 
contradictions does not foreclose who these actors are (e.g. states [parties, non-parties] 
or bureaucracies). All these open questions obviously call for the introduction of 
further distinctive criteria. Yet, with respect to both the scope and purpose of this 
working paper, this section will suffice with only presenting one further distinction to 
this type of conflict. This distinction is rooted in the question whether or not a manifest 
conflict has been preceded by a latent conflict, i.e. in what way a manifest conflict can 
be traced back to an explicit incompatibility of regime rules.  
Wherever manifest conflicts display a consequential connection to latent conflicts, 
they are classified as direct manifest regime conflicts. In other words: a direct manifest 
regime conflict is a dispute or behavioral contradiction among actors who are 
justifying their behavior by explicitly referring to the colliding rules of different 
regimes (cf. Bernauer/Ruloff 1999: 13f, 35ff). An example of a direct manifest regime 
conflict – and another example of a conflict between trade and environmental 
provisions – is the dispute on halibut fishing between Canada and Spain. The conflict 
became manifest when the Canadian Navy arrested a Spanish flag halibut-fishing 
vessel just outside the Canadian 200-mile-zone in the high seas in March 1995. 
Canada justified this action by referring to the rules of the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries Organization (NAFO)8 which promotes the public good of sustainable 
fishery resources in the “waters of the North-west Atlantic Ocean north of 35°00’ 
latitude” (Article I, No. 1 NAFO Convention). Canada claimed that, at the time of the 
incident, NAFO’s annual total allowable catch rates for halibut had already been 
exceeded. On the other hand, Spain, though being a NAFO member (via the European 
                                                 
6  Nevertheless, supposing a strict collision of rules in these three cases would turn out too simplistic 
since certain provisions in GATT might tone down the respective rule contradictions. Most 
importantly, GATT Article XX grants “general exceptions” to the agreement’s regulations. 
7  Werksman briefly offers three possible explanations for the absence of manifest disputes in the three 
cases: 1) self-restraint on behalf of WTO members that are also parties to these MEAs; 2) broad 
participation on both sides (all three MEAs have a high number of parties); 3) minor economic 
impacts of the trade in endangered species, ozone-depleting substances (ODS) and hazardous waste 
(Werksman 2001: 183f). 
8  More precisely, Canada referred to its national Coastal Fisheries Protection Act which again is based 
on the multilateral agreement underlying NAFO. This agreement, the Convention on Future Multi-
Lateral Co-operation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries (NAFO Convention), entered into force in 1979. 
Among its 18 members are Canada, the United States, Russia, Norway, and the European Union (EU).  
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 Union), interpreted the Canadian behavior as a violation of the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The convention regulates the public good of free access to 
the high seas and therefore only grants countries the right to protect their marine 
environment within their 200-mile-zones (“exclusive economic zones”, Article 57 
UNCLOS). The conflict was finally settled by an agreement in April 1995 between 
Canada and the EU, which introduced control and enforcement measures such as a 
satellite tracking system.9
Unlike direct manifest conflicts, indirect conflicts are behavioral contradictions among 
actors whose actions have been (unintentionally) induced by otherwise non-colliding 
rules of different regimes. This implies that though not legally contradictive, at least 
one of these regimes may include rules which induce a certain behavior running 
contrary to the objectives of the other regime. Therefore, one could also term this type 
“disincentive type” or “behavioral type”.10 A noteworthy example for an indirect 
regime conflict is an incompatibility occurring between two environmental regimes, 
namely the Kyoto Protocol and the Montreal Protocol. On the one hand, both regimes, 
the climate change regime and the ozone regime, intend to provide global 
environmental public goods. On the other hand, an evident incompatibility exists with 
regard to so-called hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). After the phasing-out of several 
ozone-depleting substances by the Montreal Protocol and other amendments to the 
Vienna Convention, HFCs were left as one of the major substitutes since they showed 
no indication of an ozone-depleting effect. Thus, though none of the provisions of the 
ozone regime explicitly refers to HFCs, they have given a significant incentive for 
respective companies to use these substances. However, while HFCs are important 
substitutes for ozone-depleting substances, and therefore are part of the solution within 
the ozone regime, they also represent destructive greenhouse gases to be phased out 
within the climate regime (Rosendal 2001: 99). 
Yet, as important as the proper examination of indirect conflicts might be when 
studying regime effectiveness: unlike latent conflicts and direct manifest conflicts, 
they can only concern specific tools and mechanisms. This brings us back to an 
important qualification from the preceding section, namely the distinction between 
constitutive regime conflicts, which can be signposts for public goods conflicts, and 
merely operational regime conflicts. When trying to link this distinction to the above 
typology of latent, direct manifest and indirect manifest regime conflicts, it is evident 
that the third type, indirect conflicts, falls into the category of operational disputes. 
Since by definition, indirect regime conflicts cannot rest upon an explicit incoherence 
of major regime goals, they should clearly be sorted out when looking for examples of 
conflicting public goods: likewise, the two regimes mentioned in the example do not 
collide about constitutive rules, i.e. it is not their chief objectives which are 
                                                 
9 Nevertheless, Spain appealed to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which stated in its December 
4, 1998 ruling (Fisheries Jurisdiction Case) that “the Spanish submissions no longer have any object” 
and that the court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute (Bernauer/Ruloff 1999: 35ff). 
10 This type should not be confused with the type of “behavioral interaction” used by 
Gehring/Oberthür (2004: 21f.). Given their understanding of the term, this type would rather come 
close to what above has been defined as a manifest conflict in general, i.e. prior to the distinction of 
direct and indirect subtypes. 
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incompatible. In fact, the indirect conflict between them is merely related to a 
particular mechanism, the use of HFCs, as induced by the ozone regime.  
On the other hand, latent and direct manifest conflicts can (but do not have to) be 
constitutive collisions, i.e. conflicts about core principles and objectives – and in fact, 
the trade-environment examples used above for these two types have all been such 
constitutive cases. Therefore, such conflicts between free trade and environmental 
regimes will be given further attention in the next part of this working paper. 
 
 
3  PREDICTING THE CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIME CONFLICTS 
 
This part will move beyond the level of description towards first analytical approaches 
to the issue of regime conflicts.  While it is not possible to generate and test several 
hypotheses about public goods conflicts here, the intention is to sketch a research 
agenda which builds on the aforementioned logical connection between regime 
conflicts and public goods conflicts. First of all, a research question on the outcome of 
regime conflicts will be phrased – accompanied by suggestions for an appropriate 
translation of this question into a feasible analytical design. In a second step, with a 
view to exploring the feasibility, a hypothesis shall be developed which predicts the 
potential outcome of regime conflicts. This hypothesis will not primarily draw from 
regime theory, but will be rooted in recent innovations in public goods theory. Put 
differently, the prediction shall not be based on “external” factors such as power 
constellations or consensual knowledge, but on the very character of the public goods 
whose collision underpins the regime conflict under scrutiny.  
 
 
3.1  TELLING WINNERS FROM LOSERS: WHICH REGIME PREVAILS? 
 
The major research question which shall be tackled in the course of this paper is: under 
which circumstances is the provision of a particular global public good (e.g. 
biodiversity) given priority over the provision of another global public good (e.g. free 
access to genetic resources)? Bearing in mind what has been argued earlier about the 
possible kinship of global public goods conflicts and international regime conflicts, 
this question translates into: what are the conditions under which an international 
regime prevails when conflicting with another international regime? 
When looking for an observable dependent variable hidden in these questions, a useful 
suggestion is to relate terms such as prevalence or priority to the concept of regime 
effectiveness: a regime prevails when its effectiveness has been less restrained by a 
regime conflict than the effectiveness of any other involved regime. This reasoning 
about the relative impact on regime effectiveness puts the spotlight on a specific 
dimension of the results of a regime conflict, namely the distribution of the conflict’s 
(supposedly negative) consequences for the effectiveness of the regimes involved.11
                                                 
11  When understanding the existence of a colliding regime as an exogenous challenge to a regime’s 
effectiveness, one might well argue that the more appropriate term to use here (instead of 
effectiveness) is the robustness or resilience of both regimes with regard to each other. This reasoning 
would concur with the definition of robustness as a regime’s “ability to withstand exogenous 
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 Nonetheless, with effectiveness being one of the most debated concepts by regime 
theorists, new concerns with regard to research feasibility arise. The actual range of 
the potential obstacles reveals itself when distinguishing three dimensions of 
effectiveness according to the point of impact of a conflict’s consequences: 
1)  The norms produced by the regime (output); 
2)  The regime’s behavioral effects on relevant actors (outcome); 
3)  The ultimate effectiveness of the regime with regard to its actual subject matter 
(impact) (cf. Oberthür/Gehring 2003: 26ff; Miles/Underdal et al. 2002: 10ff; 
Underdal 2004). 
Measuring a single regime’s impact effectiveness or, in the words of Young and Levy, 
its problem-solving effectiveness (Young/Levy 1999: 4f), would require taking into 
account a considerable number of control variables.12  The same goes for appraising 
the outcome effectiveness of the affected regimes. Again, it is evident that there are 
several other reasons – beside the regime conflict – which can be responsible for shifts 
in the compliance behavior of states and other parties, e.g. changes of national 
governments or external shocks such as natural disasters.  
Instead, the next pages will content themselves with focusing on immediate 
consequences for the output dimension of regime effectiveness. The output level 
includes processes that shape and alter a) the norms produced by the regimes in 
question, and b) the degree of support these norms meet in the course and in the 
immediate aftermath of negotiations, e.g. when it comes to signing and ratifying the 
respective agreements. A reliable indicator for a change of output (which could be 
linked directly to the conflict with another regime) is a treaty change – via 
amendments or side agreements, etc. Such a treaty change could either tone down or 
strengthen certain rules, in light of their (potential) incompatibility with the rules of 
another regime. A similar signpost is the inclusion of priority clauses, i.e. clauses 
which explicitly guarantee the prevalence of certain rules or even whole regimes in 
cases of conflictive overlap.13 Finally, like direct changes, concrete interpretations of 
treaty rules can serve as indicators for the consequence of a regime conflict on the 
output level. Treaty interpretations can be decided upon either by the respective 
majority of states or they can be provided by regime organs designed for dispute 
settlement. Moreover, third parties such as regime-external dispute settlement agencies 
(e.g. the ICJ), which refer to super-ordinate regulatory systems (e.g. the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties [VCLT]), might provide interpretations of 
overlapping rules (Neumann 2002: 343ff).   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
challenges without its effectiveness being diminished” (Hasenclever/Mayer/Rittberger 1996: 1; cf. 
Hasenclever/Mayer/Rittberger 2004). 
12 This is not to deny the latest methodological progress in measuring the problem-solving 
effectiveness of regimes, especially through counter-factual approaches (Mitchell 2004) and the 
“Oslo-Potsdam solution” (Hovi/Sprinz/Underdal 2003; 2003a; cf. Sprinz 2003). 
13 Such treaty changes can occur not only explicitly, e.g. by integrating or altering certain clauses, but 
also implicitly, e.g. through shifts in customary international law (Neumann 2002: 343ff.). 
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3.2  PREDICTING PREVALENCE: DESIGNED VERSUS PURE PUBLIC GOODS 
 
Turning now from the dependent variable to potential explanatory factors for the 
consequences of regime conflicts, the choice of independent variables provided by 
theories of (separate!) international regimes is abundant. Regime theories cannot only 
be attuned to the use of rationalist explanatory factors such as power (e.g. relative 
gains or hegemonic stability) and interest (e.g. situation structure or problem 
structure), but also account for non-utilitarian explanations of regime formation and 
effectiveness (e.g. fairness or consensual knowledge) (Hasenclever/Mayer/Rittberger 
1997). All these different core variables could be used as building blocks for 
assumptions about the effect of regime conflicts (cf. Stokke 2001: 11ff). However, it 
would first be necessary to reframe each of these factors in the context of the 
interactive character of regime conflicts.  
One method of “lifting” these variables, which were originally designed for separate 
regimes, up on the interactive level is to frame them in a relative/comparative manner. 
This implies comparing the particular dimensions of a variable (e.g. degree of 
legalization) across the regimes affected by a regime conflict. Hence, a possible 
hypothesis could state that the regime with the higher degree of legalization prevails.14
Which variables are appropriate for framing in this relative way? In the first place, all 
variables describing particular regime properties (e.g. geographical scope, membership 
or regime design) would be adequate. But despite the rich supply of explanatory 
factors, the focus here shall be put on a different variable, one which has arisen during 
the course of the previous considerations: the publicness of the goods which are 
regulated by the affected regimes.  
This brings us back to the previous excursion into whether free trade can be considered 
a global public good at all. True, having argued earlier in favor of such an assessment 
might have paved the way for interpreting conflicts between trade and environmental 
regimes as conflicts among public goods. But on the other hand, this understanding of 
free trade as a public good has also blocked the way to a rather simple assumption 
about the outcome of conflicts among environmental and trade regimes: if free trade 
were considered a private good, the consequence of the conflict (which then would 
take place between a public good and a private good) could be explained in the 
tradition of Olson’s collective action theorem. The respective assumption would state 
that in case of a conflict between a regime regulating a private good and a regime 
regulating a public good, the former would prevail. For obvious reasons however, this 
assumption is useless for predicting the outcome of conflicts among two or more 
public goods. 
Do we thus have to conclude that the literature about public goods is not helpful at all 
when it comes to generate assumptions about conflicts among their very research 
objects? Fortunately, the answer is no: in fact, there is an essential difference between 
                                                 
14 A different method would be that of relational framing, i.e. assuming the existence of an 
encompassing dimension of the respective variable resulting from regime interaction, e.g. a certain 
power constellation among actors across the involved regimes. Whereas relatively framed independent 
variables explain the distribution of the consequences, i.e. of the advantages and disadvantages caused 
by a regime conflict, relationally framed ones explain the overall extent of these consequences. 
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 the character of the public good “free trade” and environmental public goods which 
might prove particularly useful when trying to explain the outcome of the conflicts 
between these two types of goods. But in order to point out this difference, one has to 
go beyond the classical understanding of the term given by Samuelson (1954) who had 
based his definition of public goods on the non-rivalry and non-excludability of 
benefits.  
Kaul and Mendoza expanded this definition by distinguishing between goods which 
are public due to their innate properties (“pure public goods”, e.g. peace and security 
or environmental sustainability) and goods which are “de facto public” or “designed to 
be public” (e.g. basic education or health care). The publicness of the latter type of 
goods, in particular the publicness of their consumption, is the result of a social 
construction, for instance because special rules need to be applied in order to guarantee 
a good’s non-exclusiveness, e.g. laws providing free access to education 
(Kaul/Mendoza 2003: 80ff; cf. Kaul 2003: 2ff).  
More importantly, these two different kinds of publicness entail a difference in the 
roles that regimes play for the respective goods: in the case of “designed” or de facto 
public goods, regimes can be the major provider of the quality of publicness in 
consumption itself, as in the case of global trade liberalization, which would not be 
thinkable without the impact of the GATT and other WTO laws. Therefore, one can 
assume that with respect to designed public goods, the costs of free-riding, i.e. non-
compliance, for each actor are higher (since such behavior endangers the non-
exclusiveness of the good) than in cases where regimes regulate pure public goods 
(such as biological diversity or ozone layer protection), because even non-compliance 
would not – at least in the short run – put the publicness in access to/consumption of 
the good at stake. Furthermore, non-compliance might, in the worst case, lead to the 
expulsion from a regime which – in the case of a designed public good – might also 
clearly diminish an actor’s access to the respective good: For example, when excluded 
from the global trade regime, a country might still take advantage of some of the 
regime’s impacts, e.g. the prevention of trade conflicts; but it cannot further rely on 
being treated according to the most-favored nation (MFN) clause by other regime 
members.  
In sum: when engaging into “forum shopping” (Raustiala/Victor 2004: 8), i.e. when 
seeking out the forum most favorable to their interests in light of a cost-benefit 
analysis, actors should tend to support the regime regulating the designed public good. 
Remodeling the above hypothesis according to this re-definition of public goods, one 
can state: In case of a conflict between a regime regulating a designed public good and 
a regime regulating a pure public good, the former will prevail. 
In light of this hypothesis it becomes obvious why collisions between environmental 
regimes and free trade regimes deserve special attention: Such collisions provide a 
database for comparative studies on conflicts between a designed public good (free 
trade) on the one hand and pure public goods (ecological resources) on the other. 
Given both the confines of this working paper and the state of the art of research on 
public goods conflicts, this is neither the place nor the time to present the results of 
such studies. However, in the following, one example of such a conflict will be chosen 
in order to provide a first, albeit superficial examination of the above hypothesis – 
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which hopefully helps stimulate further research on this type of public goods conflicts 
in the future.  
The example is the well researched (cf. Rosendal 2000, 2001, 2003, 2006) 
incompatibility between the CBD and the TRIPS agreement. The case can be 
classified as a direct manifest conflict since disputes between actors took place both 
during and after the genesis of both regimes. Moreover, it is a constitutive regime 
conflict since the two regimes adopt diverging positions on an aspect pivotal to both of 
them, namely on property rights to genetic resources. TRIPS seeks to strengthen and 
harmonize intellectual property rights systems, hence trying to facilitate the public 
good of individuals’ access to such resources. On the other hand, the CBD intends to 
protect the public good of biological diversity by reaffirming “that states have 
sovereign rights over their own biological resources” (Preamble CBD). Put in terms of 
publicness: Instead of aiming for the public access to genetic resources, as the TRIPS 
agreement does, the CBD rather advocates the “equitable sharing”, i.e. the public 
distribution, of benefits from utilization of genetic resources (Article 1 CBD).15  
As for more specific rules, TRIPS calls for patent legalization in all technical fields 
including biotechnology: “patents shall be available for any inventions, whether 
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve 
an inventive step and are capable of industrial application” (Article 27, No. 1 TRIPS).  
TRIPS excludes plants and animals from patentability in, albeit stating that, until 2000 
(and developing countries until 2005 respectively), “members shall provide for the 
protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis subsystem 
or by any combination thereof” (Article 27, No. 3 TRIPS). This more or less implies 
the introduction of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) for plants.  
The contradiction of core principles between the two regimes has so far not led to 
disputes among states on the regime-external level (e.g. in the form of trade conflicts 
or lawsuits), but it has been the subject of several conflicts within regime organs, both 
between bureaucracies and negotiating parties. These controversies date back to the 
founding phases of both regimes which partially, in the early 1990s, took place at 
parallel timelines. Clearly, both processes of regime genesis exerted mutual impacts on 
each other, while developing and industrialized countries could score quite differently 
in the two arenas. Though the CBD had originally been advocated by several (OECD) 
member states of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD, including the United States!), particularly developing countries influenced its 
content in the end. On the other hand, the genesis of the TRIPS Agreement in the 
course of the Uruguay Round was clearly dominated by Western European countries 
and the United States – with the latter explicitly complaining about the strategy of 
some developing countries to undermine TRIPS via the CBD (Rosendal 2003a.: 11f, 
Raustiala 1997: 47).  
                                                 
15 Besides serving as an example for conflicts among designed and pure public goods, the CBD-TRIPS 
case hence also illustrates potential tensions between the publicness in access/consumption on the one 
hand and publicness in distribution on the other: Since patenting is a costly business, multinational 
corporations might take advantage of the public access under the TRIPS approach by securing 
monopolies over numerous varieties of genetic material, including those which have been developed 
over generations by indigenous and local communities. In fact, such behavior, termed as bio-piracy or 
bio-prospecting, has already taken place to a considerable extent: today, developing countries do not 
hold more than three per cent of all patents worldwide (Rosendal 2003a: 9). 
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 Even after the original negotiations had ended and both documents had entered into 
force, these disputes have continued until the present day within different settings and 
arenas. Roughly, three ‚theatres’ of this ongoing conflict can be distinguished, two of 
them displaying a slight, but nonetheless obvious prevalence of the TRIPS agreement 
regarding the output dimension of regime effectiveness: 
First of all, further controversies have taken place within the institutional architecture 
of both regimes, e.g. in the CBD’s Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access 
and Benefit-sharing. An important observation in this regard is that efforts to 
strengthen the position of the CBD in the course of debates on the WTO level have 
clearly failed. For instance, the United States – not being party to the CBD – 
repeatedly voted against the CBD secretariat’s request for observer status during 
TRIPS conventions (Rosendal 2003a: 13ff). Moreover, developing countries have so 
far been unsuccessful with their suggestion for a treaty change, namely to build CBD 
principles into the TRIPS agreement, e.g. a requirement for disclosure of the source of 
patent-relevant biological resources.16  
Second, disputes have taken the form of an “arms race” (ibid.: 18; cf. Rosendal 2006) 
of follow-up or side agreements. When assessing the stakes for both regimes in this 
second arena, it is again the TRIPS side which appears to have an advantage. True, the 
CBD approach to genetic resources has met some support by several regional 
agreements on intellectual property rights which partially run counter to TRIPS rules. 
Such agreements have been adopted by the Andean Community (CAN) and by the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Raghavan 2000).17 But on the other hand, 
several bilateral ‘TRIPS plus’ agreements have been negotiated between the United 
States or the EU on the one side and a developing country on the other. These 
agreements clearly undermine CBD principles, by even exceeding TRIPS demands on 
patent standards.  
Third, additional negotiating forums have been established, e.g. within the UN’s Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and within the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), in order to deal with the issues of access to genetic resources, of 
prior informed consent and of benefit sharing. The positions voiced in these forums 
roughly mirror the major approaches to genetic resources as represented by CBD and 
                                                 
16 Brazil, India and further countries with highly diverse biological resources keep pushing for an 
amendment of the TRIPS Agreement which would clearly safeguard key CBD objectives. 
Accordingly, the amendment shall allow members to ask patent applicants for disclosure of a) the 
country of origin of biological resources, b) evidence of prior informed consent by the country of 
origin, and c) evidence of fair and equitable appropriate benefit-sharing agreements with the country 
of origin (cf. Meier-Ewert 2005). 
17 The CAN IPR-regime was established in the name of TRIPS, however it asks for an amendment of 
the Agreement’s Article 27, No. 3, lit. b, in order to account for potential conditions of patentability 
such as prior informed consent. The OAU Model Law is even more straightforward in its opposition to 
TRIPS provisions and explicitly requires the permit and the prior informed consent of importing 
communities. Another type of CBD-endorsing follow-up treaties are bilateral agreements on bio-
prospecting; the CBD’s Ad Hoc Working Group on Access and Benefit Sharing prepared the ‘Bonn 
Guidelines’ in 2002 in order to include prior informed consent and other principles into such 
agreements (Rosendal 2003a: 13ff). 
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TRIPS. However, these additional arenas have so far not produced an output of norms 
which could promote the prevalence of any of the two regimes. 18  
What implications does this preliminary examination of the case have for this working 
paper’s assumption on conflicts between designed and pure public goods? The short 
answer is: it seemingly supports the hypothesis – with the designed public goods 
regime, TRIPS, having a slight advantage over the pure public goods regime. However 
and not surprisingly, the hypothesis is still far from being confirmed. Naturally, more 
in-depth research is needed; on other cases, but also on the CBD-TRIPS case itself. As 
for the latter, without trying to undermine the main hypothesis of this paper, it is fair to 
end this section by pointing out three qualifications and caveats: 
First of all, the case is not closed, i.e. as long as the introduction of IPR systems 
remains a contested issue in most developing countries, the CBD’s claim for national 
sovereign rights over biological resources might still exert a considerable compliance 
pull. Even more, the above examination has only focused on the output dimension of 
effectiveness. A complete picture should include medium-term and long-term 
consequences of the regime conflict with a focus on how the regimes involved 
promote behavioral change (outcome effectiveness) and problem-solving (impact 
effectiveness) 
Second, even when conceding that, for the time being, the TRIPS agreement prevails, 
the precise reasons for this finding are still obscure. So far, all that has been detected is 
merely a correlation between a potential explanatory factor, the constructed publicness 
of a good, and the predominance of the regime providing it. But the actual causal 
pathways between both variables still need to be clarified and examined, e.g. by 
investigating the extent to which cost-benefit rationales (with regard to the 
consumption of both public goods) have determined member states’ positions and their 
subsequent behavior. Even more importantly, an in-depth examination would have to 
tell the impact of such reasoning from the influence of other rationalist factors which 
might have equally strengthened the robustness of the TRIPS agreement. One of these 
factors is the degree of legalization, given that the WTO with its dispute settlement 
and compliance mechanisms obviously gives parties good reasons to abide (Rosendal 
2003: 16f.). Another potential cause, which can be held partly responsible for the 
preliminary outcome of the case, is that the TRIPS agreement has been supported by 
the more powerful coalition of countries.  
Finally, when looking beyond the CBD-TRIPS case, one can find regime conflicts 
whose consequences run counter to the hypothesis above. For instance, when 
                                                 
18 These new forums and treaties include FAO’s International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture and WIPO’S Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property Rights and 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore. This is not to state that FAO has only 
recently played a role in these issues. Quite to the contrary, had it not been for the pharmaceutical 
sector and its concern about emerging biotechnologies, the ‘gene wars’ might have been left to the 
non-legally binding FAO documents (Rosendal 2003a: 7). As early as 1983, the FAO International 
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources had declared all categories of such resources a common 
heritage of mankind. Moreover, the 2001 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for food and 
agriculture explicitly prohibits patenting of material from gene banks in the public domain. However, 
this recent FAO agreement “will hardly block patenting altogether. Even slight modifications of the 
germ plasma may qualify for patent protection and the isolation and description of any particular gene 
may still count as an invention” (ibid.:13). 
 19
 negotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the parties 
anticipated potential conflicts with several environmental regimes which regulate pure 
public goods. Surprisingly, they agreed on guaranteeing the prevalence of these 
regimes through a priority clause in the text of the final document. Correspondingly, 
the agreement states that in cases of inconsistency between NAFTA on the one hand, 
and CITES, the Montreal Protocol or the Basel Convention on the other hand, the 
obligations of the latter prevail (Article 104 No. 1 NAFTA). 
All in all, these considerations insinuate that the above hypothesis needs further 
examination and modification if necessary. The particularity of this assumption was 
that it built on the very character of the goods regulated by the conflicting regimes, 
trying to translate information gains from recent literature on public goods into an 
analytical approach. But even if the doubts with respect to the plausibility of this 
hypothesis will hold true, this should not keep scholars from embarking upon the 
analysis of such conflicts altogether. As suggested at the beginning of this section, 
regime theory provides us with a number of other potential explanatory factors. These 
factors might – once being reframed with regard to regime interaction – prove valuable 
when predicting the outcomes of regime conflicts, and, thus, of conflicts among the 
public goods underlying these regimes. 
 
 
4  CONCLUSION 
 
This working paper calls for a closer consideration of international regime conflicts 
when trying to assess the character and outcome of conflicts among global public 
goods. This observation not only holds true for the policy domains looked at in this 
paper – namely free trade and environmental protection – but it should equally apply 
to the collision of global public goods in other issue areas. What can be expected to 
differ across the various domains is the plausibility of independent variables when 
trying to explicate the prevalence of a certain good over another. As a matter of fact, 
the brief discussion on the appropriateness of a particular hypothesis has already 
documented that looking at international regime conflicts confronts scholars with a 
highly complex research object, with long causal chains and many different 
explanatory factors which need to be taken into account.  
Nevertheless, this should not deter, but rather attract scholars, since the potential 
theoretical and practical rewards are equally tempting. First of all, dealing with regime 
conflicts can significantly contribute to institutionalist theories, e.g. by framing and 
adapting some of the existing theories in order to lift them up to the inter-regime level, 
or by gaining additional and innovative theoretical assumptions about the genesis or 
consequences of regime conflicts. And second, and most importantly, the study of 
international regime conflicts can have immediate practical relevance regarding the 
question of the effective provision of global public goods. Some of the research 
findings could be translated into policy propositions regarding the harmonization of 
present regulative systems, with a subsequent improvement in the production of the 
public goods by these systems.  
With regard to environmental public goods, for instance, it seems particularly 
necessary to promote the robustness of existing regimes by means of appropriate data 
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and suggestions on how to actively handle their conflicts with other regimes – 
especially as long as they will not be backed up by the (rather unlikely) establishment 
of a (powerful) World Environment Organization (cf. Biermann/Bauer 2004). Put in 
pessimistic terms (from an ecological point of view), only the analysis of intersections 
and frictions between regimes can substantially confirm the intuitive assumption of 
relatively “weak” environmental regimes and public goods. Put in optimistic terms, the 
inter-regime approach might uncover supportive conditions for the strengthening of 
environmental regimes in their role as public goods producers as well as for synergetic 
effects of free trade and global environmental protection.  
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